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ADMIRALTY
Frank L. Maraist*
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Admiralty law applies to torts which have "locality" and "flavor,"
i.e., torts which occur on navigable waters and which bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.' "Navigable waters" is de-
fined as those which are "used, or . . . susceptible of being used" as
highways of commerce between two or more states or between the United
States and another country. 2 The Supreme Court's decision in Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Richardson3 that a collision between two pleasure boats
has "maritime flavor" invites a reassessment of whether the mere "sus-
ceptibility" of use of certain waterways for commercial purposes is
sufficient to make those waters "navigable." This is so because the
Court's reason for classifying pleasure boat collisions as maritime torts
is that the operation of pleasure boats in navigation channels utilized
by commercial vessels could "affect" maritime shipping and commerce;
thus, the regulation of the navigation of pleasure boats has "maritime"
flavor.4 Under this rationale, if the waters are in commercial use, pleasure
boating may have a significant effect upon commercial shipping; how-
ever, if the waters are not in, but are merely "susceptible" of such
use, the requisite impact upon commercial shipping may be absent. The
counter-argument is that if actual use is required, then the applicability
of state or federal substantive law becomes contingent upon the presence
of isolated or sporadic commercial activity. This latter argument swayed
the United States Sixth Circuit to join most of the other circuits5 in
holding that waters are "navigable" if they are capable of use as
"highways of commerce," even though there is no present commercial
use. 6 The issue remains in doubt, however, because of some conflicting
lower court jurisprudence.7
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982); see
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972) (a
strong disfavor of "locality alone" rule was expressed).
2. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 577 (1870); In re Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 3
S. Ct. 434 (1884).
3. 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982).
4. Id. at 674-77, 102 S. Ct. at 2658-60.
5. See, e.g., United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, .454
U.S. 940 (1981); Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982).
6. Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1983).
7. See Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980).
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The courts also have encountered problems in applying the "locality"
and "flavor" test to product liability claims. A product liability claim
will have "locality" if it arises from damage caused on water, although
the product was manufactured and sold on land.' This result creates
difficulty with the formulation of a test for the requisite "flavor" when
a defective product made on land causes injury on water. Since maritime
products liability law may differ from state law, fairness may require
that the use of the product in a maritime setting must have been
foreseeable to the manufacturer/seller. 9 Is foreseeability of use in a
maritime setting enough, or must the use also be one which bears a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity? The answer may
come from the flood of abestos litigation which has spilled over into
maritime law. In those cases the issue has not been foreseeability of
use in a maritime setting, but whether there is "maritime flavor" in
the activity in which the victim was engaged when he was injured by
the product.10 Asbestos work in a maritime setting usually involves either
construction or repair of vessels. Some courts have concluded that
exposure to asbestos in either construction or repair is not sufficient to
confer maritime jurisdiction." Other courts have indicated that exposure
during the repair of vessels may confer admiralty jurisdiction, but ex-
posure during ship construction will not. 2 Both of these approaches
may have missed the mark. Maritime law distinguishes between con-
struction and repair of vessels in determining which contracts fall within
8. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980); Jig
the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub nom., Atlantic Marine, Inc. v. Jig III Corp., 424 U.S. 954 (1976)
(negligent design of ship on land).
9. If the manufacturer could not have foreseen that he would be exposed to liability
under the products liability law of a particular sovereign, it may be unfair to measure
his conduct in placing the product on the market by the laws of that sovereign. This
premise may underlie in part the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the reach of a state's
"long arm" statute. Ordinarily, a state exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident is not
prohibited, either by choice of law rules or constitutional guaranties (outside of due
process) from applying its own law to the case. Thus the "fairness" of permitting a state
to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident may rest in part upon whether the non-resident
could have foreseen that the state's law could apply to his conduct.
10. See, e.g., Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1984); Austin
v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Zelaskowski v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
578 F. Supp. 11 (D.N.J. 1983); Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 576 F. Supp.
596 (E.D. 'La. 1984).
11. Austin, 705 F.2d at 1; Harville v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 731 F.2d 775
(11th Cir. 1984); Francois v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
12. See authorities discussed in Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir.
1984).
[Vol. 45
19841 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
admiralty jurisdiction," but the distinction is primarily historical and
can be supported on policy grounds which are foreign to the issue of
whether an asbestosis claim by an injured shipyard worker is maritime. 4
The more relevant authority is the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA), which extends maritime compensation
benefits to workers who are engaged in "maritime employment," and
lists shipbuilding and ship repair as examples of such activity." The
correct policy inquiry is whether there is a need for a uniform national
rule governing the right of a maritime worker (or his employer who
has paid LHWCA benefits) to recover from the manufacturer of a
defective product. The courts appear inclined toward the conclusion that
there is not.
TORTS
Courts which have considered the question have been unanimous in
their adoption of strict liability,' 6 as outlined in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 7 into maritime products liability law.
Although district courts within its jurisdiction had been applying Section
402-A in maritime claims,'" the Fifth Circuit did not squarely reach the
issue until early in 1984. In Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 9
the court ruled that (1) strict liability is available in maritime products
liability actions brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, (2) that
13. See, e.g., North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co.,
249 U.S. 119, 39 S. Ct. 221 (1919); see also Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis
McDonald, 254 U.S. 242, 41 S. Ct. 65 (1920).
14. The distinction dates back to the early case of The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857), where a contract for ship construction was regarded as
beyond admiralty jurisdiction for the incidental reason that the contract was "made on
land, to be performed on land." Id. at 402. Shipbuilding contracts usually are negotiated
by parties who possess equal bargaining power and who are aided by skilled counsel.
Since the parties may provide or choose the law between them, there is no need for, nor
expectation of, a uniform national or international rule. This is not necessarily true in
the context of a contract for the repair of what may be a disabled ship. Absent a uniform
national rule in the latter case, the commerce in which an individual shipowner might
involve a particular vessel could conceivably be limited to those states where state contract
law favored the owner.
15. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903 (1983).
16. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972);
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977);
authorities cited id. at 1134-35.
17. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
18. See, e.g., Houston-New Orleans, Inc. v. Page Eng'g Co., 353 F. Supp. 890 (E.D.
La. 1972); Kirkalady v. Alamo Transp. Chem. Co., 320 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969).
19. 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984).
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the test for such liability is that prescribed in section 402-A, (3) that a
product is "defective" in maritime products liability law if it is "un-
reasonably dangerous, ' 20 and (4) that strict products liability may include
the failure to warn of a foreseeable and unreasonable danger presented
by a product, even though there is no manufacturing or design defect
in the product. The court set forth guidelines for determining the scope
of the duty to warn; those guidelines require a warning which is rea-
sonable in light of all of the circumstances. 21
Recent Fifth Circuit decisions highlight the defenses which are avail-
able in a strict products liability claim governed by maritime law. In
Pavlides22 the court ruled that in a "failure to warn" case a manufacturer
may assert as an affirmative defense that the user (1) already had actual
knowledge of the specific risk, (i.e., the specific hazard and the extent
of the harm that would follow) and (2) made an informed choice to
"brave" the hazard. 23 Thereafter, in Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 24 the court
ruled that comparative negligence applies to reduce recovery against the
manufacturer in strict products liability cases governed by maritime law.
Then in National Marine Service, Inc. v. Petroleum Service Corp.25 the
court ruled that in a maritime strict products liability action, "no dis-
tinction should be made between assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence, but that the plaintiff's conduct (whether theoretically mere
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk) should be analyzed
solely under the principles of comparative fault .... ,"26 Ofie may
conclude from these cases that if the condition which makes the product
unreasonably dangerous is one which is not discoverable in the excercise
of reasonable care by the user, and the user does not in fact discover
it, he may recover the full amount of his damages. However, if the
"defect" is discoverable by the use of ordinary care, the user's discovery
and use, 27 or his failure to discover, will not bar his recovery, but will
reduce it on the basis of a comparison of his "fault" with that of the
manufacturer.
DAMAGES
The issue of how damages for loss of earning capacity should be
20. Id. at 338 n.13.
21. Id. at 338-39.
22. Id. at 330.
23. Id. at 340.
24. 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (reh'g en banc).
25. 736 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 277.
27. This presumes that when a user has actual knowledge of the specific risk but
makes a voluntary choice to "brave" the hazard, his conduct is functionally indistin-
guishable from assumption of risk. Since the user's conduct also constitutes contributory
negligence, it should reduce but not bar his recovery, under the rationale of National
Marine Service.
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calculated has dominated maritime law in recent years. 2 The current
problem area is the manner in which inflation should be considered by
the trier of fact in determining how much income the plaintiff (or the
plaintiff's decedent, in a wrongful death case) would have earned if the
injury had not occurred. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,29
the Supreme Court ruled that courts could use one of the following:
(1) the "specific forecast of future inflation" method, (2) the "below
market discount rate" method, or (3) a modification of the total "offset"
method. However, the Court discouraged use of the "specific forecast"
method, which it found to be "unreliable" and "costly." 30 Prior to
Pfeifer, the former Fifth Circuit had ruled that courts within its juris-
diction could use either the "specific forecast" or "below market dis-
count rate" methods.' After Pfeifer, however, the former Fifth Circuit
reconsidered the matter en banc;3 2 the decision, which has come to be
known as Culver II, specified that the "below market discount rate"
is the only method which should be used in calculating the effect of
inflation upon loss of earning capacity.33 The court also refined its
earlier decision by requiring that the fact finder make an adjustment
for the effect of income tax upon the interest which can be earned by
the plaintiff from the lump sum of future earnings.3 4
Under Culver II, the trier of fact must predict all wage increases
which the worker would have received during his work-life, other than
those increases resulting from inflation. He then must discount that sum
by the "below market discount rate," which is the market interest rate,
adjusted for the effect of any income tax and reduced by the estimated
rate of general future price inflation. The method by which the "below
market discount rate" is determined may result in an inconsistency in
the court's rationale. Culver II provides that if the parties do not stipulate
to the "below market discount rate," they may introduce expert testi-
mony concerning the appropriate rate.35 However, the "below market
discount rate" is calculated by first determining the "market interest
rate," and then reducing that by the "specific forecast of future infla-
tion" method.3 6 Apparently, the court anticipates that stipulations of
the "below market discount rate" will become commonplace.
Culver II is the governing precedent in the new Fifth Circuit. How-
28. See Maraist, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Admiralty, 44 La. L. Rev.
223, 229-32 (1983).
29. 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2556.
31. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (reh'g en banc).
32. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied
sub nom., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culver, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
33. Id. at 117, 122.
34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 122.
36. Id. at 118.
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ever, six of the judges of the present court dissented in Culver IF7 and
four others elected not to participate in the decision. 8 Culver 11's re-
jection of the "specific forecast of future inflation" may not survive
subsequent scrutiny by an en banc panel of the present Fifth Circuit.
However, the judicial effort and agony which one senses was involved
in Culver I and Culver H might preclude such a reconsideration in the
near future.
SEAMEN
Helicopter pilots generally have failed in their efforts to gain seaman
status in the Fifth Circuit; the court has ruled that a helicopter is not
a "vessel" for the purpose of such status.3 9 In Hebert v. Air Logistics,
Inc.4 0 plaintiff contended that he was a seaman because he was per-
manently assigned to a "fleet" of vessels which he served as a helicopter
pilot. The court rejected his contention, but did not rule out the pos-
sibility that some helicopter pilots could qualify as seamen under the
theory. In Hebert, the pilot (1) was not employed or directly controlled
by the owner of the "fleet" but by his payroll employer, an independent
contractor, (2) performed none of the vessel's "special mission" work
(in this case, laying pipeline), and (3) spent little time on any of the
vessels and was not permitted to go into the vessels' work areas. The
Fifth Circuit may reach a different result if the pilot is employed or
controlled directly by the vessel owner and performs some work aboard
the vessel.
Workers on fixed platforms ordinarily do not acquire seaman status
because they lack the requisite connexity with a vessel. The platform
upon which they work is not a vessel.4 1 Platform workers sometimes
are ferried to and from, and are housed at the platform on vessels,
but usually do not perform a significant part of their work aboard those
vessels. 42 However, some vessels which transport workers to the platforms
are not mere "buses" or "floating hotels," but are specially designed
for use by workers in the performance of their duties on the platforms.
A vessel may be used to store and carry tools, pipe, or other equipment,
and the platform workers may perform some of their platform work
while aboard the vessel. In such a case, the vessel's "special mission"
37. Id. at 123, 125, 126.
38. Id. at 116.
39. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983).
40. 720 F.2d 853 (1983).
41. Myrick v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342, 1348 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. See Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co., 468 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1972);
Longmire, 610 F.2d at 1342.
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is ngt merely to carry workers to a platform and house them there,
but is also to aid in the performance of the platform work. A platform
worker may qualify as a seaman as to this kind of "support vessel,"
even though he does not perform the traditional seaman's duties aboard
the vessel, and even though his primary work assignment is on the fixed
platform .43
The standard applied to a directed verdict (and a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict) in maritime cases is the "reasonable minds
could differ" test generally applied in federal courts, and in most state
courts: the court must submit the issue to a jury if there is evidence
from which reasonable minds could conclude the existence of every fact
essential to the plaintiff's claim. 4 In Jones Act cases, the courts generally
apply the "scintilla" test: the court must submit the matter to the jury
unless there is a complete absence of probative facts as to an essential
element of the plaintiff's claim.45 Where Jones Act and unseaworthiness
claims are joined, the different standards should apply to a determination
of liability, but it may be illogical to charge a jury that it can find
that the plaintiff is a seaman as to one of the claims but not the other.
Such a result is possible if the Fifth Circuit adheres to earlier decisions
applying the "scintilla" test to the issue of seaman status in a Jones
Act case.4 6 In Wallace v. Oceaneering International,47 the court may
have avoided that problem by ruling that in Jones Act claims the
"scintilla" test applies to the issue of employer liability (negligence and
cause in fact) and damages, but the "reasonable minds" standard should
be used to determine whether the plaintiff is a seaman.
The "scintilla" test can be a sword as well as a shield to the Jones
Act seaman. In Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,48 the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a seaman is not entitled to a directed verdict (or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict) on the employer's claim of contributory
43. The Fifth Circuit held that a claimant who was always assigned to either of his
employer's two such special purpose vessels was entitled to summary judgment as to
seaman's status. Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 714 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Longmire,
610 F.2d at 1347 n.6.
44. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S. Ct. 1077 (1943).
45. See, e.g., Comeaux v. T. L. James & Co., 666 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1982).
46.. Indeed, some language in Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959),
supports the conclusion. The court wrote that "there is an evidentiary basis for a Jones
Act case to go to the jury: (1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was assigned
permanently to a vessel . . . or performed a substantial part of his work on the vessel
. . " Id. at 779 (emphasis added). The overwhelming majority of Fifth Circuit cases,
however, have used the "reasonable minds could differ" test in assessing whether there
is a jury issue as to seaman status. See, e.g., Landry v. Amoco Prod. Co., 595 F.2d
1070 (5th Cir. 1979); cases cited id. passim.
47. 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984).
48. 708 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
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negligence unless there is a "complete absence of probative facts" to
support the conclusion that the seaman was contributorily negligent.
Traditionally, each federal court of appeal handling maritime cases
has established a fixed daily sum for maintenance; a seaman receives
that fixed sum for each day he is entitled to maintenance, and is not
required to prove the amount of living expenses he actually requires. 49
The modern approach requires the seaman to prove as a fact the amount
of maintenance to which he is entitled. 0 Proof may be made either by
(1) expert testimony as to the reasonable cost of subsistence in the
community in which the seaman is residing, or (2) the seaman's testimony
of his own expenditures for maintenance." If the seaman fails to produce
any evidence of the amount of maintenance, two approches can be used
by the courts. One is to grant him recovery of the traditional fixed
sum; the other-which the Fifth Circuit has adopted-is to deny the
seaman any award for maintenance. 2
Collective bargaining agreements between the seaman's union and
the shipowner may provide that if the seaman is entitled to maintenance,
the amount shall be a sum fixed by the agreement. The courts are
divided on the issue of whether the seaman is bound by that amount,
or whether he may prove that his subsistence costs are greater. 3 If the
shipowner and union agree to a low maintenance sum in exchange for
other benefits (pensions, overtime pay and the like), and such an agree-
ment is not against public policy, it would be unfair for a court to
deprive the shipowner of the benefit of his bargain. However, a bar-
gaining "tradeoff" may not be expressed in the labor agreement, and
the data which would permit the court to make a determination that
there was a "tradeoff" may not be available or may be costly to obtain.
Unless the labor agreements are for unusually long terms, the seaman's
bargaining representative can be expected to correct any miscalculations
at the next bargaining session. The better course may be to bind the
seaman to the maintenance rate fixed in his union contract.
49. Incandela v. American Dredging Co., 659 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1981). See also
G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty § 6-12, at 307 (2d ed. 1975).
50. Incandela, 659 F.2d at 14; see Tate v. American Tugs, Inc., 634 F.2d 869 (5th
Cir. 1981).
51. See, e.g., Incandela v. American Dredging Co., 659 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1981); Morel
v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982); Caulfield v. AC & D
Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. Curry v. Fluor Drilling Serv., Inc., 715 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1983).
53. Compare Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983)
(holding that the plaintiff, a union member, is bound by an $8 maintenance rate set forth
in the collective bargaining agreement, although the evidence would sustain a $30 per
diem rate) with Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(holding that an inadequate maintenance rate in a collective barganing agreement is not
binding upon a plaintiff seaman).
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FORUM Non Conveniens
When foreign law applies to a claim pending in an American ad-
miralty court, the court may either retain jurisdiction or dismiss the
claim on the theory of forum non conveniens. Forum non conveniens
is appropriate only if there is an alternative forum in which the plaintiff
may proceed against the defendant.5 4 In Veba-Chemie A.G. v. M/V
Getafix,5 5 the defendant stipulated that it would submit to the jurisdiction
of the alternative forum, although it was not subject to jurisdiction in
that forum when the plaintiff initially filed his suit in the American
court. The Fifth Circuit then ruled that in forum non conveniens, the
alternative forum need only be available at the time of the dismissal;
thus, the defendant's submission to jurisdiction at the alternative forum
as a condition of dismissal made the forum "available" for the purposes
of the forum non conveniens analysis.5 6 When forum non conveniens
is urged in an admiralty proceeding, the balancing, analysis prescribed
by Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert7 is applicable. The factors to be considered
in making the anaylsis include:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view
of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. 8
However, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 5 9 When forum
non conveniens is urged in an admiralty in rem proceeding, the interests
which support retention of jurisdiction usually outweigh the defendant's
interest in a change of forum. One of these interests is the need to
provide the plaintiff with jurisdiction over the vessel where it can be
found; another is that dismissal will deprive the plaintiff of control over
a valuable asset, the property seized or the bond which replaces it.
Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/ V Tel A viv6° demonstrates
that forum non conveniens is not always inappropriate in an in rem
proceeding. There, the defendant showed both convenience in the al-
ternative forum, and a willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of, and
54. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947); Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S. Ct. 828 (1947).
55. 711 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 1248.
57. 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
58. Id. at 508, 67 S. Ct. at 845.
59. Id.
60. 711 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1983).
19841
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to post equivalent security in the alternative forum. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that those factors may constitute a showing sufficient to
overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum. 6'
LONGSHOREMAN AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
[LHWCA]
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, workers on mineral production
platforms constructed over navigable waters may recover worker com-
pensation benefits either under the LHWCA, or under the Louisiana
worker compensation laws. 62 Both of these compensation schemes reim-
burse the worker for only part of his loss-two-thirds of his wages
during some or all of his work-life, and medical expenses. 61 Much of
the worker's damages, particularly the remaining value of his earning
capacity and his pain and suffering, either is not compensated, or is
compensated through a tort action against someone other than his em-
ployer.
Since a platform is treated as land for purposes of admiralty tort
jurisdiction, Louisiana law usually applies to the platform worker's tort
claims against third parties. 64 Two primary defendants in these third
party claims are the platform owner and the general contractor who
has contracted with the worker's employer for performance of part of
the general contract with the owner. The general contractor may be
liable either becase his employees negligently injure the subcontractor's
employee, or because the injury is caused by a "defective thing" under
the control of the general contractor. 65 The owner's liability usually is
predicated upon his ownership of the platform, a building for whose
defects he is strictly liable under Louisiana Civil Code article 2322.66
Worker compensation schemes usually provide tort immunity to an
injured worker's payroll employer and to the worker's "statutory em-
61. Id. at 1239.
62. The LHWCA applies to platform workers on the Continental Shelf by virtue of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 333 (1982). See Herb's Welding v.
Gray, 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that oil production workers on fixed platforms
within territorial waters could recover benefits under the LHWCA), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1589 (1984). Thompson v. Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., 419 So.2d 822 (La.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 48 (1984), holds that the Louisiana worker's compensation
act may be applied to workers on fixed platforms on the Continental Shelf.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1983); La. R.S. 23:1221 (Supp. 1984).
64. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1983); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S.
352, 89 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
65. See, e.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978). In Olsen the
Louisiana Supreme Court responded to certification of the issue by the Fifth Circuit and
held that a platform is a building as that term is used in Civil Code article 2322. Id. at
1290.
66. Id.
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ployer," i.e. the persons for whom the payroll employer is performing
work. The Louisiana worker's compensation law provides "statutory
employer" tort immunity to any person whose "trade, business, or
occupation ' 6 7 is being performed by a worker, even though the person
claiming immunity does not pay or secure compensation benefits for his
injured employee.
Prior to the September, 1984 amendments, 68 the provisions of the
LHWCA as to "statutory employer" immunity were cryptic. 33 U.S.C.
905(a) provided that "(t)he liability of an employer" for LHWCA
benefits "shall be exclusive . . . of all other liability of such employer
to the employee." '69 Section 904(a) made "[e]very employer" liable for
compensation benefits, and "[iun the case of an employer who is a
subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the
payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor .unless
the subcontractor has secured such payment." ' 70 The prevailing inter-
pretation of the two sections in the lower courts prior to the 1984
amendments was that the LHWCA provided a contractor with "statutory
employer" immunity from a tort action by an employee of a subcon-
tractor only when the contractor paid LHWCA benefits to that employee
after the subcontractor had failed to pay or secure such benefits. 7' Since
the coverages of the LHWCA and the Louisiana worker's compensation
law overlap, and the two schemes contain differing rules on "statutory
employer" tort immunity, a crucial question is which tort immunity
provision should be applied. The issue was first presented to the Fifth
Circuit in Jenkins v. McDermott, Inc.7 2 a case in which the platform
owner claimed tort immunity under Louisiana law because the employer
was making voluntary payments to the worker under the state compen-
sation scheme. The court, assuming that the owner was not entitled to
tort immunity under the LHWCA, ruled that he could not claim im-
munity under state law, at least until the worker had made a binding
election to proceed under the state compensation scheme. 73
67. La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1984); see I W. Malone & A. Johnson, Worker's
Compensation § 128, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1980).
68. Longshore and Habor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-426, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1639 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as LHWCA Amendments], signed by the President on September 29, 1984, made
a number of amendments to the LHWCA, including a change of its name to the
"Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."
69. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
70. Id. § 904(b).
71. See, e.g., Probst v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 379 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1967);
Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959).
72. 734 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 234.
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The prior jurisprudence, and the court's assumption in Jenkins, were
undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in the "bombshell" case of
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson (WMA TA). 7 4
On its face, WMATA is a somewhat innocuous decision, obviously
oriented toward a .desirable result-promotion of opportunities for small
businesses in the District of Columbia. 7 However, the import of the
decision is that under the pre-1984 LHWCA, the owner of, and the
general contractor on oil production platforms are immune to tort suits
by employees of subcontractors, and that the owner is immune to tort
suits by employees of the general contractor. Although its precedential
effect is limited, WMATA deserves a closer look.
In WMATA, the defendant was engaged as owner and general
contractor in the construction of a rapid transit system in the District
of Columbia, where the LHWCA applies to non-maritime worker-injury
claims.7 6 The defendant, for reasons probably unrelated to tort consid-
erations, purchased LHWCA coverage for the employees of its subcon-
tractors.7 7 When sued in tort by some of those employees injured while
engaged in the construction project, WMATA urged that it was immune
from tort liability. The majority of the Supreme Court sustained WMA-
TA's contention, using the following logic: (1) WMATA was a contractor
who had secured the payment of LHWCA compensation benefits to the
employees of a subcontractor (through the "wrap up" policy insuring
all employees of all of its subcontractors), (2) the subcontractor had
not secured compensation, (3) WMATA was entitled to secure compen-
sation before the subcontractor defaulted (and was not required to wait
until after such default), and (4) the term "employer" in Section 905(a)
included a general contractor. Thus WMATA, as a general contractor
who had secured LHWCA compensation benefits, was an "employer"
entitled to tort immunity, under Section 905(a).
The majority did not confine the language of its opinion to the
precise facts before it, but made these sweeping pronouncements:
[Section 4(a)] simply places on general contractors a contingent
obligation to secure compensation whenever a subcontractor has
failed to do so. Taken together, §§ 4 (a) and 5(a) would appear
to grant a general contractor immunity from tort suits brought
by subcontractor employees unless the contractor has neglected
74. 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984).
75. One may infer from the majority opinion that the purchase by WMATA of
LHWCA coverage for its subcontractors was motivated at least in part by a desire to
make such coverage available to small contractors at a rate which would enable them to
compete effectively with other contractors for the WMATA project. See id. at 2828-34.
76. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-301 to 36-304 (1981).
77. See supra note 75.
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to secure workers' compensation coverage after the subcontractor
failed to do so.
We conclude, therefore, that §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the LHWCA render
a general contractor immune from tort liability provided the
contractor has not failed to honor its statutory duty to secure
compensation for subcontractor employees when the subcon-
tractor itself has not secured such compensation. So long as
general contractors have not defaulted on this statutory obli-
gation to secure back-up compensation for subcontractor em-
ployees, they qualify for § 5(a)'s grant of immunity.7
The dissent read the majority opinion as providing tort immunity to
the general contractor and the subcontractor, so long as one of them
secured compensation. Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and two
others, opened his dissent by observing: "The Court today takes a 1927
statute and reads into it the 'modern view' of workers' compensation,
whereby both the contractor and the subcontractor receive immunity
from tort suits provided somebody secures compensation for injured
employees of the subcontractor." 7 9 Later, the dissent quipped: "Con-
tractors such as WMATA are, thus, cast in the role of backup quart-
erbacks who get paid for sitting on the bench. They need do nothing;
as long as the starting quarterbacks perform, the backups receive equal
benefits. "80
The first application of WMA TA to platform injuries interpreted the
case as the dissent did. In Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield Co."' the plaintiff
was injured while performing work in connection with his employer's
contract with the defendant, the owner of a fixed platform. The plain-
tiff's employer had secured LHWCA compensation; the defendant had
not. Nevertheless, the district judge concluded that defendant was entitled
to tort immunity under the WMA TA decision.
WMA TA's life may have been as short as it was tumultuous. Congress,
which was revising the LHWCA when WMATA was decided, added
language in the amendments which was intended to overrule WMATA
retroactively."a To the extent WMATA has any precedential effect, it
may eliminate the most vulnerable defendants in a platform worker's
78. 104 S. Ct. at 2835-36.
79. Id. at 2836 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 2837.
81. No. 83-0351, slip op. (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 1985).
82. Section 905(a), which provides that the liability of an employer prescribed in
Section 904(a) "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
the employee," 33 U.S.C. § 905 (a) (1983), is amended to add that "[for the purposes
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third party action. However, WMATA may be read narrowly, in one
of these ways:
1. Tort immunity extends to the general contractor, but not the
platform owner. This argument is tenable because an essential
element of the WMATA majority's rationale was the fact that
WMATA was a "contractor" under 904(a) who secured com-
pensation for employees of its "subcontractor," and that a
"contractor" could be an "employer" under 905(a). In addition,
section 904 does not speak in the broad terms of "trade, busi-
ness, or occupation," so as to encompass within "statutory
employer" immunity an owner who is not a general contractor.
2. Tort immunity extends to the contractor (and perhaps the owner)
only where the subcontractor fails to secure compensation.
If WMATA is limited in this latter fashion, the decision, even if it has
any precedential effect, will have little impact upon cases pending prior
to the 1984 amendments since the owner or general contractor usually
does not permit the subcontractor to commence work on the platform
until the latter has secured LHWCA compensation.
There is no easy answer to the policy decision faced in WMATA and
in the 1984 amendments overruling it. The "enterprise"-the oil and
gas industry and its customers-already is bearing the cost of LHWCA
of this subsection, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor's em-
ployees only if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of compensation as required
by section 4." LHWCA Amendments, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) at
1641 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a)). Section 904(a) now provides in relevant part
that "[iun the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, only if such subcontractor
fails to secure the. payment of compensation shall the contractor be liable for and be
required to secure the payment of compensation. A subcontractor shall not be deemed
to have failed to secure the payment of compensation if the contractor has provided
insurance for such compensation for the benefit of the subcontractor." Id. (emphasis
added) The report of the Congressional Conference Committee which completed the work
on the 1984 amendments states that:
The Conference substitute also provides a special effective date, so that these amend-
ments apply to pending suits. This will avoid the dismissal, under WMATA, of
third-party suits which were pending or on appeal on the date of enactment. (Any
suit which has gone to final judgment from which no appeal lies as of the date
of the enactment would not be subject to the amendments). WMATA, the con-
ferees believe, does not comport with the legislative intent of the Act nor its in-
terpretation from 1927 through 1983. The case should not have any precedential
effect.
House Conf. Rep. No. 1027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2771, 2774. The United States Fifth Circuit has construed the amend-
ment as retroactively overruling WMATA. See Martin v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 746 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1984); Doucet v. Atlantic Richfield, No. 84-4536 slip op. (W.D. La. Jan.
30, 1985).
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benefits to injured employees because the cost of LHWCA premiums
undoubtedly is passed on to the industry through the subcontract price.
The employee presumably is bearing the remaining cost-one-third of
his earning capacity, and his pain and suffering-but this may be the
quid pro quo for the high wages his occupation commands. The owner
and general contractor should be somewhat stimulated toward platform
safety by the fact that they ultimately bear any increased premiums for
LHWCA coverage. However, exposure to awards for tort damages may
heighten safety consciousness on fixed platforms since (1) the owner or
contractor may not be able to pass that cost back to the subcontractor
through indemnity provisions, and (2) even if he is able to do so, the
cost may be returned to him through increased contract prices. On the
other hand, if the platform owner is forced to bear the ultimate cost
of the worker's damages which are not compensated through the LHWCA,
that cost will be spread among those who use the product-the consumers
of oil and gas products-rather than the injured worker and his neigh-
bors. Such a result seems appropriate.
A maritime worker injured in. a work-related accident may recover
LHWCA benefits from his employer, and may bring a tort action against
a third party whose negligence was a cause of the accident.83 The
employer may recover from the third party tortfeasor the LHWCA
benefits he has paid the worker, either through subrogation 4 or as-
signment to the employee's rights, 5 or in an independent tort action
against the third party tortfeasor.16 In most cases, the assignment does
not take place, because the employee timely files suit against the third
party tortfeasor, and the employee's claim is of such magnitude that
the employer need not assert any independent tort claim for the LHWCA
benefits he has paid. Thus, subrogation is the normal method by which
the employer recoups compensation benefits from third party tortfeasors.
A problem arises when the maritime worker's recovery from the third
party is not sufficient to pay the employer's subrogation lien, satisfy
the fee of the employee's attorney, and provide the employee with sonit.
recovery in addition to the LHWCA benefits he has received from his
employer. The landmark case is Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.87 There, the employee obtained a judgment in the amount of $60,000
from the third party tortfeasor; however, the employer had paid the
employee about $17,000 in compensation benefits, and the employee's
83. 33 U.S.C. §§ 933(a), 905(b) (1983).
84. See Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1078 (1976).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1983).
86. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 89 S.
Ct. 1144 (1969).
87. 445 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980).
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attorney was entitled to a one-third contingency fee. The employee sought
to tax the employer with a share of the attorney's fees; if successful,
it would have increased the employee's net recovery from $23,000 to
$28,000. The Supreme Court rejected the employee's contention with
broad language indicating that the maritime employer should never be
required to bear part of the employee's attorney's fees in third party
actions. However, that broad language was undercut by a footnote
suggesting that the shipowner may be required to bear part of the
attorney's fees if the recovery against the third party is less than the
sum of the lien and the employee's expenses of the suit, including
attorney's fees."8 The first two appellate courts to consider the issue
were divided on whether the maritime employer could be required to
bear part of the attorney's fees when the recovery was not sufficent to
pay both the lien and the expenses of the suit. 9
In this setting, the Fifth Circuit entertained Ochoa v. Employers
National Insurance Co. 90 in which the employer obtained a judgment
in the amount of $62,000, the subrogation lien totaled $42,000, and the
expenses of the suit, including attorney's fees, amounted to about $31,000.
The court first distinguished Bloomer as a case in which the judgment
was sufficient to pay the subrogation lien and the expenses of the suit
and also provide the employee with a meaningful net recovery. In Ochoa,
however, the employer and the employee's attorney could not recover
all of their claims, and the employee would receive nothing from this
third party action. The court determined that the funds should be
distributed in this manner: (1) out of pocket expenses, (2) the fee of
the employee's attorney if the court finds it reasonable, (3) the sub-
rogation lien, and (4) the employee's net recovery. 9' The court also
observed that if allocation in that manner did not provide the employee
with a significant net recovery, the trial court could make an equitable
adjustment of the attorney's fee so that the employee will "share in
the recovery." The Ochoa approach would appear to encourage more
third party actions by employees. It also may encourage the employer
to explore his independent claim against the third party tortfeasor.
Ochoa's future seems bright in the light of a 1984 amendment to the
LHWCA, 92 for the Supreme Court, after earlier granting certiorari,
88. Id. at 86-87 n.13, 100 S. Ct. at 932 n.13.
89. Compare Incorvaia v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 668 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 293 (1982) with Johnson v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 629
F.2d 1244 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980).
90. 724 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 321, vacated and remanded,
105 S. Ct. 583 (1984).
91. Id. at 1177.
92. In 1984, § 33(f) of the LHWCA was amended to provide in relevant part that
if the employee brings an action against a third person, the employer shall be required
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vacated and remanded the case for consideration in light of the LHWCA
Amendments of 1984.
93
DEATH ACTION
When a victim dies as a result of a maritime tort, his personal
representative may bring an action for wrongful death, either under
special statutes 94 or under the general maritime law. 95 The personal
representative also may recover survival damages through the Jones Act,
if the victim was a seaman and the claim is based upon an employer's
negligence. 96 In all other cases, including those in which the claim is
based upon unseaworthiness, the right to recover survival damages is
not as certain. The Death on the High Seas Act does not provide for
survival benefits, and a provision of the Act arguably precludes recovery
of survival benefits under the general maritime law. 97 The Supreme Court
has not yet recognized that a cause of action for survival benefits exists
under the general maritime law; Moragne and its progeny in the Court
involved wrongful death benefits. Thus, in cases other than those under
the Jones Act, the recovery of survival benefits depends upon the answers
to two questions: (1) does the maritime common law encompass a
survival action, and (2) if so, does it apply beyond three miles, or does
DOHSA preclude recovery of survival damages for deaths occurring
outside territorial waters? 98 Sparse jurisprudence thus far has answered
the first question in the affirmative; 99 in Kuntz v. Windjammer "Bare-
foot" Cruises, Ltd.,'0 a federal district court answered the second
question in the affirmative. The court's conclusion required that it reject
to pay as LHWCA compensation benefits a sum equal to the excess of such benefits
over the "net amount" recovered from the third person tortfeasor, and defines the "net
amount" as the actual amount recovered less "the expenses reasonably incurred . . .
(including reasonable attorney's fees)." LHWCA Amendments, 1984 Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) at 1652 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 933(f)).
93. 724 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 321, vacated and remanded,
105 S. Ct. 583 (1984).
94. The Jones Act provides wrongful death benefits for beneficiaries of seamen killed
by employer negligence. 46 U.S.C. § 688; 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1983). The Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1983), provides wrongful death benefits for beneficiaries of
persons who die as a result of an act occurring on the high seas.
95. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
96. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1983).
97. See 46 U.S.C. § 765 (1983); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 620, 625, 98 S. Ct. 2010, 2012, 2015 (1978) (implying that § 765 represents Congress'
"considered judgment" on the survival action issue).
98. See supra text accompanying note 92.
99. See, e.g., Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
100. 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 188 (1984).
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the argument that section 765 of the DOHSA represents "Congress'
considered judgment" that there should be no recovery of survival
benefits in death claims beyond territorial waters.10' Thus, the general
maritime law survival remedy (recognized by the lower courts) should
apply on such waters.
The court's decision appears sound. Section 765 is not a survival
statute, but a combination "nonabatement" and "conversion" statute.10 2
It merely provides that if the victim files suit and then dies as a result
of the injury, his suit for personal injury damages is converted into a
claim by his beneficiaries for wrongful death benefits under DOHSA.
Maritime law should not create additional anomalies unless the result
is clearly dictated by statute. The personal representative of the victim
of a maritime tort should be able to recover survival damages, either
under the Jones Act (where the victim is a seaman, the defendant is
his employer, and the wrongful conduct is negligence) or under the
general maritime law (in all other cases).
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Perhaps the most indefensible rule in maritime law is that the owner
of a pleasure boat may claim the benefits of limitation of liability. 03
Limitation, designed to coax investors into maritime shipping, serves no
useful purpose when the investment is in a personal pleasure vessel. In
most pleasure boating accidents, the boat operator's liability insurer,
who has accepted a premium for underwriting the risk, will provoke
limitation for its insured, and thus limit its own liability to little or
nothing.
Although the rule is indefensible, it has been impregnable. However,
a district judge recently refused to apply limitation to a pleasure boat,
observing that "[tihe history and purpose of the limitation statute make
it obvious that it was never meant to apply to pleasure boats, and
allowing these small craft to creep under this Act's coverage perverts
justice."' ° This view is logical and courageous, but is against the over-
whelming weight of authority. 05 Nevertheless, the decision may provide
the higher courts with a tool by which the rule may be reevaluated.
101. Id. at 1284-86.
102. See Mobil Oil, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
103. See 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1983) (limitation provisions applicable to all vessels); 3
Benedict on Admiralty § I at 1-3 n.6 (I. Hall ed. 1980); G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra
note 49, § 10-23 at 880.
104. Baldassano v. Larsen, 580 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Minn. 1984).
105. A comparison of those authorities cited by the Baldassano court indicates as
much. See id.
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OBSTRUCTION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS
Federal statutes impose upon the owner of a vessel sunk in navigable
waters the duty to immediately mark the wreck and to remove it.' °6 If
the owner was not guilty of any negligence in the sinking, he may
abandon the wreck to the United States.10 7 Where such abandonment is
accomplished, the United States (through the Corps of Engineers) has
the duty to remove the wreck,0 8 but it may recoup the removal costs
from the third party whose tort caused the sinking.' °9
The shipowner whose vessel is sunk in navigable waters faces con-
siderable uncertainties. His right to abandon is premised upon his free-
dom from fault, but fault is not determined by a litmus paper test,
and the United States habitually refuses to admit the shipowner's freedom
from fault by accepting the abandonment. A shipowner thus is frequently
faced with the unhappy choice of either removing a wreck he is not
required by law to remove (and forfeiting his insurance coverage for
the cost of such removal' 0 ), or subsequently paying the United States
the costs it incurs in removing the wreck. In Agri-Trans Corp. v.
Gladders Barge Line, Inc."' the shipowner sought to evade the dilemna
by seeking a judgment declaring that it was not at fault and was not
responsible for removal of the wreck. The Fifth Circuit denied the relief
sought. The court first concluded that the Corps of Engineers may not
require removal of a wreck which does not pose an obstacle to navigation
or navigable capacity." 2 However, the court ruled that the determination
of whether a sunken vessel obstructs navigation first must be made by
the Corps, as an administrative decision. Until that decision is made,
a court may not entertain a suit by the shipowner seeking a declaration
that he is not liable to remove the vessel or compensate the United
States for the expenses of removal." 3
106. The Wreck Act, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1983), provides:[W]henever a vessel . . . is
wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel. . . it shall be the duty of the owner
of such sunken craft to immediately mark it and to maintain such marks until
the sunken craft is removed or abandoned . . . and . . . to commence the
immediate removal of the same ....
107. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vest Transp. Co., 666 F.2d 932, 940-41 (5th
Cir. 1982); Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co. v. M/V Delta, 598 F.2d 930, 934 (5th
Cir. 1979).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 414 (1983).
109. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204-05, 88 S. Ct.
379, 387-88 (1967).
110. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. 721 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 1009-10.
113. Id. at 1010-11.
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The maritime common law developed the unusual rule that the failure
of a shipowner (or the United States, where the duty devolved upon it)
to mark a sunken vessel relieved the tortfeasor whose negligence caused
the sinking from liability to third persons subsequently damaged by the
unmarked wreck. 1 14 In the dialect of tort law, the failure to mark the
wreck becomes the superseding cause which breaks the chain of causation
between the tortfeasor who caused the sinking and the third party victim
who collides with the sunken vessel. That rule may have encouraged
compliance with the Wreck Act," 5 but it also permitted a tortfeasor to
escape liability for some of the foreseeable consequences of his wrongful
act. In Nunley v. M/V Dauntless Colocotronis,16 the Fifth Circuit
refused to follow the rule, and held that the subsequent failure of the
owner (or of the United States) to mark or remove the vessel does not,
as a matter of law, relieve the tortfeasor whose negligence caused the
sinking from liability to third persons damaged by collision with the
unmarked wreck. The failure to mark or remove may in some circum-
stances be a superseding cause, but in other cases the tortfeasor who
causes the sinking will bear all or part of the loss sustained by third
persons. The court did not offer concrete guidelines as to when the
third party tortfeasor will be liable. It would appear, however, that if
there is no negligent failure to mark the wreck, the tortfeasor who
caused the sinking should bear the whole loss sustained by third persons;
the damage is foreseeable and there simply is no intervening negligence
which could break the chain of causation. If there is a negligent failure
to mark the wreck, the vessel owner and the sinking tortfeasor ordinarily
should share the loss. However, as Prosser has remarked, in such cases
"there must be a terminus somewhere, short of eternity, ' "1 7 of the initial
tortfeasor's liability. The relative abilities of the parties to remove the
wreck, the severity of the danger posed by the wreck, and the length
of time between the sinking and the third party damage all may be
relevant factors to consider in reaching a difficult and elusive decision.
114. See, e.g., Lowery v. The Ellen S. Brouchard, 128 F. Supp. 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 229 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1956).
115. See 128 F. Supp. at 23.
116. 727 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
117. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 44, at 289 (4th ed. 1971).
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